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Abstract— The ability to safely confine the trajectories of
small UAS to a specific geographical area is a key enabler
for capabilities that require operating in close proximity to
populated areas as well as other users of the airspace. These
capabilities require highly reliable geofencing algorithms. In
particular, these algorithms must promptly alert imminent
breaches of keep-in/keep-out geofences by considering factors
such as the vehicle speed and uncertainties in the state of
the aircraft. This paper presents a novel approach to the
prevention of geofence boundary violation based on closure rate
constraints. These constraints are incorporated into a control
framework to effectively prevent fence breaches. Simulation
results illustrating an example use case of this framework are
presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increased usage of small unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS) by hobbyists and commercial operators has resulted
in a growing number of safety and regulatory concerns.
Operational anomalies such as loss of remote control (RC)
or telemetry link with the UAS can result in the operator
losing the ability to control the vehicle. This could lead to
the vehicle flying away and posing risk to life forms and
property on the ground, and also other users of the airspace.
Geospatial constraints called geofences help impose vir-
tual boundaries that restrict the area of operation of small
UAS vehicles. Geofences help uphold the safety of UAS
operations, protect civilian and other life forms, prevent
destruction to property. Geofencing has grown to become
an essential functionality for small UAS. Indeed, most
commercial-off-the-shelf autopilot systems today incorporate
some kind of geofencing functionality. These geofencing
systems provide the operator with warnings about fence
breaches and take appropriate actions such as return to home
or land to prevent fly aways. Furthermore, independent ge-
ofencing modules that can be added on to existing autopilots
are currently under development.
The growing regulatory emphasis on geofencing systems
and their associated safety implications make it desirable to
have assurances of their correct behavior. It is also important
to understand the effects of discrete sensor update rates
and uncertainties on the behavior of geofencing systems.
In particular, these can affect the selection of appropriate
mission parameters. This paper uses a modeling framework
that incorporates discrete sensor updates and position un-
certainties. Several of the formulas presented in this paper
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are formally proved in the Prototype Verification System
(PVS) [1]. The use of formal verification tools, such as
PVS, provides high assurance on the correctness of the
mathematical development presented in this paper.
This paper provides an algorithm for geofence violation
detection and prevention. Specifically, this paper studies the
relevant constraints that must be imposed on a vehicle’s
velocities to prevent a fence breach, taking into account the
dynamics of the vehicle, performance, and sensor uncertain-
ties. This analysis naturally lends itself to the construction
of a command filtering scheme, typically referred to as a
reference governor, that can be added on to a vehicle’s
control law to effectively prevent geofence violations. This
paper is organized as follows: Section II surveys related
work. Section III constructs the required constraints that must
be considered to prevent fence breaches. Section IV uses
the proposed constraints to construct a reference governor
filter scheme that helps resolve any imminent fence breaches.
Section V presents simulation results on a use case. Section
VI provides discussions and Section VII concludes this work.
II. RELATED WORK
The notion of geofencing seems to first appear in the
context of location based services and notifications [2].
Unlike location based services, the widespread adoption of
geofencing technology in safety-critical applications such as
the operation of small UAS, warrants careful analysis of the
properties of these algorithms to ensure that they perform
as expected for all possible input configurations and initial
conditions.
The use of geofences as an effective safety tool to enforce
airspace constraints was emphasized in [3]. Recognizing the
safety-critical role played by geofences for small UAS, the
author outlines an architecture that envisions a geofencing
system independent from the primary autopilot. This system
would run on a secondary processor thus providing redun-
dancy if the autopilot were to malfunction. Similar ideas
were also identified for assured airspace containment in [4].
Narkawicz et al. rigorously analyzed the properties of ray-
casting based algorithms to determine if a given point in 3D
space is located within a polygon [5], [6]. The algorithms
were modeled in PVS, and several important properties
were formally proved in that system. An implementation
of these algorithms called PolyCARP is provided in several
programming languages. Dill et al. proposed an independent
geofencing system called Safeguard [7]–[9], which uses
an alternative implementation of the PolyCARP algorithms.
Safeguard, which consists of a self-contained hardware and
sensor suite, serves as an external geofence system constantly
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monitoring for imminent violations using a ballistic trajec-
tory model. The outputs of Safeguard can be configured to
terminate flight or implement other appropriate responses.
In line with the architecture discussed in [3], Stevens et
al. developed an implementation of a platform independent
add-on geofencing system for small UAS and demonstrated
its feasibility on an off-the-shelf autopilot system [10].
The independent goefencing system had three different user
configurable modes of operation [11]: (i) shared control, (ii)
return to land, and (iii) local loiter. In [12], the authors
formally define the notion of geofencing and outline the
data requirements of a geofence. Furthermore, in [13], the
authors evaluate the various geofencing algorithms such as
ray casting and triangle weight approximations, and explore
their computational complexities.
The work presented in this paper proposes two funda-
mental developments that aid the construction of efficient
geofencing systems for rotorcraft UAS. First, constraints
that must be enforced on the aircraft’s velocities to pre-
vent geofence violations are analyzed as a function of the
vehicle’s position and heading within the geofence. In the
second development, the constraints developed above are
utilized to generate a filtering mechanism that eliminates
control inputs that could lead to geofence violations. The
second development is in line with the shared control scheme
proposed in [11]. The detailed framework presented in this
work applies to general geofences rather than just rectangular
shapes.
III. GEOFENCE CONFLICT DETECTION
There are two primary components to an onboard geofenc-
ing system: (1) conflict detection and (2) resolution. Conflict
detection for geofencing is concerned with monitoring the
vehicle’s position for imminent fence breaches taking into
account the dynamics of the vehicles, sensor uncertainty
and and mission constraints. Resolution is concerned with
reacting to an imminent fence breach to mitigate any risk
involved and prevent the fence breach.
There are several steps required to determine if an object
moving at a certain speed can result in a fence breach.
The capability to recognize if a given point is within the
fence (a polyhedron) is prerequisite for conflict detection.
The problem of finding if a given point in 3-D space is
located inside or outside a polyhedral volume of airspace was
considered in [5], [6]. One method used in those algorithms
is ray casting. Given a 2D point, a ray is cast from the
given point to infinity. If the line makes even (odd) number
of crossings with the polygon edges, the point is outside
(inside) the polygon. Formal properties of these algorithms
were verified using PVS [6].
A. 1-D Analysis of constraint violation
Consider a particle moving in 1D towards a point P .
Let d represent its proximity to P and c represents its
closure rate to P . The position of the particle is sampled
at regular intervals ∆p. Let σ represent the uncertainty
(standard deviation) in the particle’s position. The estimated
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Fig. 1. Proximity to edge vs maximum closure rate
distance moved by the particle between position updates is
given by
Dgps = c∆p + 2σ. (1)
Assuming the goal is to stop the particle before crossing
P by applying a deceleration of a¯, the maximum distance
moved by the particle before stopping is given by
Ddec =
c2
2a¯
. (2)
A timely warning generated to prevent the particle from
crossing P should take into account the distance moved
by the particle between position updates and the distance
moved during the response applied to prevent violation.
Consequently, a monitoring algorithm to prevent the particle
from crossing P should at least provide a warning when the
particle is at a distance of d∗ from the point P , where
d∗ = Dgps +Ddec,
d∗ = c∆p + 2σ +
c2
2a¯
. (3)
Alternately, the maximum allowable closure rate at any given
distance d from point P is given by the positive root of the
following quadratic equation:
c2
2a¯
+ c∆p + 2σ − d = 0. (4)
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between the proximity dis-
tance d and the maximum closure rate c∗(a¯max, d) computed
using equation (4). Thus by enforcing the constraint
c ≤ c∗(a¯, d) (5)
a timely warning can be generated to prevent the particle
from crossing point P .
B. 2-D analysis of constraint violation
Let ~x = [x, y] represent the particle’s position and let ~v =
[vx, vy] represent the particle’s velocity in 2D space. Let PQ
represent a line segment, and let r (short-hand for restrict)
be a Boolean indicating whether the algorithm should ensure
separation from the infinite line containing PQ (in which
case r = false) or from the restricted line segment PQ
(in which case r = true). Let dr represent the distance of
the particle to this line (when r = false) or line segment
(when r = true). Let nˆr represent the unit vector from ~x to
the closest point on this line or line segment. For example,
if ~x = [−2, 1] and PQ is the line segment between the
points [−1, 0] and [1, 0], then nˆfalse = [0,−1], and nˆtrue =
[1/
√
2,−1/√2]. When PQ is a segment on the boundary of
the restricted region, nˆr points in the direction of the region.
The closure rate (cr) of the particle to line or line segment
is given by
cr = nˆr · ~v. (6)
Thus, enforcing the constraint (5), where the closure rate c
is determined by (6), results in the constraint
cr ≤ c∗(nˆr · ~a, dr), (7)
where ~a is the deceleration vector of the particle. It has been
formally proved in PVS that in the constraint (7) is sufficient
to guarantee separation from the line segment P , at least in
the case of negligible update rates and position uncertainty.
C. Application to polyhedron
Consider a keep-in polygon with N edges. As above,
let nˆr i represent the unit vector in the direction of edge
i ∈ {1 . . . N}, and let dr i denote the distance to the line
containing edge i (when r = false) and edge i (when
r = true). A timely warning to prevent a particle from
exiting the convex keep-in polygon can be generated by
enforcing the constraint 7 on all edges. Thus,
cr i = nˆr i · ~v, ∀i ∈ {i = 1, . . . , N}, (8)
cr i ≤ c∗(nˆr · ~a, dr i). (9)
For convex keep-in regions, constraint (9) is used with
r = false. For non-convex polygons and keep-out re-
gions, constraint (9) is used with r = true. However, for
these polygons, it is often difficult or impossible to enforce
constraints (9) for each edge simultaneously. Alternately,
constraint (9) is enforced only on the active edges for which
nˆr i ·~v ≥ 0. Here, an edge i is considered active if dfalse i =
dtrue i. However, note that if the nearest point on the nearest
edge corresponds to a vertex (common point between two
adjacent edges), then it is sufficient to check (9) where the
closure rate cr i (given by (6)) is defined with respect to the
averaged normals of the adjacent edges.
IV. GEOFENCE CONFLICT RESOLUTION
These constraints discussed above can be used to construct
a command filtering mechanism to eliminate control inputs
that can lead to fence breaches. The following sections first
discuss the preliminaries of a command filtering mechanism
called a reference governor [14], [15]. Subsequently, the ref-
erence governor scheme is applied to prevent fence breaches.
A. Reference Governors
Consider a closed-loop discrete-time linear system defined
by
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bv(t), (10)
y(t) = Cx(t). (11)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the state vector, v(t) ∈ Rm is the
filtered input vector, and y(t) ∈ Rp is the output vector. Here,
the closed-loop system is assumed asymptotically stable,
(i.e., all eigen values of A are strictly in the interior of the
unit disk). Constraints are imposed on the output variables
y(t).
At each time instant, reference governors compute a
command v(t) such that, if kept constant from t onwards,
the resulting output will always satisfy the constraints1. Let
O∞ define the set of all states x and inputs v such that the
predicted response from the initial state x with a constant
input v satisfies constraints.
O∞ = {(v, x) : yˆ(k|v, x) ∈ Y,∀k ∈ Z}, (12)
where the predicted response is given by
yˆ(k|v, x) = CAkx + C
k∑
j=1
Aj−1Bv (13)
= CAkx + C(I −A)−1(I −Ak)Bv. (14)
Here Y represents the constraint admissible set for the
outputs.
Given the actual input r(t), let the filtered v(t) be
parametrized as
v(t) = v(t− 1) + β(t)(r(t)− v(t− 1)). (15)
At each discrete time step, the following optimization prob-
lem:
β(t) = max
β∈[0,1]
β (16)
s.t. (v, x(t)) ∈ O∞.
is solved to compute the filtered input commands that can
prevent constraint violation.
B. Application of reference governors to geofencing
Let the dynamics of the closed-loop system of a small
UAS (rotorcraft) be represented by equation (10). Here,
x = [x, vx, y, vy] represents the state of the vehicle. A,B
represent the closed-loop system dynamics with a control law
1For the dynamical system in this work where one or more eigen values
are on the unit disk, constraint satisfaction is imposed up to a time horizon.
that can track a given velocity input. For example, consider
the following dynamic model:
A =

1 0.1 0 0
0 0.94 0 0
0 0 1 0.1
0 0 0 0.94
 , (17)
B =

0 0
0.1 0
0 0
0 0.1
 .
The closed-loop system (A) is not Shur and therefore
equation (14) cannot be used for predicting the output.
Instead, equation (13) is used to compute the predicted output
for a given horizon k. Note that the required output here is
the component of the velocity perpendicular to the nearest
edge, i.e., in equation (11):
C = [0, nx, 0, ny]. (18)
Note that here nx, ny represent the unit normal to the nearest
edge. The input v is parametrized as follows:
v(t) =
[
β 0
0 β
] [
r1(t)
r2(t)
]
, (19)
β ∈ [0, 1]. (20)
Here, r1, r2 represent the unfiltered velocity commands.
Given the non-linear constraints (9), β is computed using
the bisection approach discussed in [15]. Note that here, con-
straint satisfaction is checked only up to a given prediction
horizon k.
V. RESULTS
The approach discussed above provides an efficient way
of integrating geofence conflict detection and resolution into
an existing control framework. Consequently, this framework
is applicable to several real world use cases. As a concrete
example, this work illustrates the application of the proposed
framework to a structural inspection type mission.
Consider an inspection mission where an operator is
manually flying a rotorcraft to acquire imagery of a structure
such as a building or bridge. In such missions, it is crucial
to maintain a safe stand-off distance from the structure
to prevent colliding into the structure. Maintaining precise
control in close proximity to the structure can be challenging.
Adequate depth information can be hard to perceive from the
vantage point of a remote pilot or from an onboard camera.
With the proposed approach, a remote pilot can maneuver the
vehicle near the structure focusing on acquiring appropriate
imagery rather than being concerned about colliding into the
structure.
Figure 2 illustrates a simple keep-out geofence (in red) sur-
rounding the structure under inspection. A simple control law
distorted with noise to simulate human inputs is constructed
to maneuver the vehicle around the geofence thus represent-
ing a typical inspection mission. The trajectory of the vehicle
is indicated in blue. Notice in Figure 2, the vehicle enters the
keep-out geofence at several locations. Figure 3 illustrates
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Fig. 2. Simulated pilot inputs with noise drives the vehicle around the
keep-out fence (in red) representing an inspection mission. Trajectory (in
blue) starts at (5,38) and moves clockwise around the fence. Intermittent
fence breaches are observed at several locations.
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Fig. 3. Velocity (m/s) vs time (s) response of the vehicle. β = 1 implies
that the original commands are passed through without any filtering.
the velocity components of the vehicle as it circles the
geofence. Figure 4 represents the same scenario but with the
simulated human inputs filtered using the scheme discussed
above. Consequently, the filtering mechanism eliminates all
components of velocities that can lead to the fence violation.
The attenuation of the input command is represented by the
β parameter indicated in Figure 5. Figures 6-9 indicate the
same results on a non-convex keep-out geofence.
VI. DISCUSSION
The analysis of constraint violation in Section III was
focused on rotorcraft vehicles. The maximum closure rate
calculation assumed decelerating to a complete stop as a
feasible maneuver. For fixed wing vehicles, turning away
from the fence boundary using the maximum turn radius is
a feasible maneuver. Consequently, equation (2) should be
replaced with the turn radius used for the resolution.
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Fig. 4. Vehicle response with the reference governor scheme. Trajectory
(in blue) starts at (5,38) and moves clockwise around the fence. No fence
breaches are observed.
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Fig. 5. Velocity (m/s) vs time (s) response of the vehicle. β indicates the
amount of command attenuation.
0 20 40 60 80
x
10
0
10
20
30
40
50
y
Fig. 6. Simulated pilot inputs with noise drives the vehicle around the
keep-out fence (in red) representing an inspection mission. Trajectory (in
blue) starts at (85,25) and moves clockwise around the fence. Intermittent
fence breaches are observed at several locations.
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Fig. 7. Velocity (m/s) vs time (s) response of the vehicle. β = 1 implies
that the original commands are passed through without any filtering.
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Fig. 8. Vehicle response with the reference governor scheme. Trajectory
(in blue) starts at (85,25) and moves clockwise around the fence. No fence
breaches are observed.
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Fig. 9. Velocity (m/s) vs time (s) response of the vehicle. β indicates the
amount of command attenuation.
Constructing the reference governor requires identifying
the dynamic model of the closed-loop system A,B and its
associated uncertainties. The formulation presented in this
work did not account for any process or sensor uncertainty.
However, as shown in [16], the reference governor can be
modified to deal with uncertainties.
The output prediction (equation 13) requires the user to
specify a look-ahead horizon. A suitable look-ahead horizon
can be selected based on the application and available
computing capability. The larger the look-ahead horizon, the
computation of β at each time step becomes more expensive.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work analyzed the constraints required by an effective
geofence monitoring algorithm to generate timely warnings
to ensure a resolution can prevent fence breaches. Constraints
are imposed on the closure rate of the vehicle to a fence edge.
These constraints are incorporated into a command filtering
mechanism to eliminate components of the command that
lead to constraint violations. Use case results illustrating the
effectiveness of the proposed framework are presented.
The novel contributions of this work are the development
of constraints on the closure rate of the vehicle with respect
to a geofence edge, the rigorous mathematical analysis
performed in the formal verification system PVS, and the
utilization of the closure rate constraints in a reference
governor formulation to prevent geofence violation.
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